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THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF 
COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS AND 
NATIONAL DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS1 
HOWARD HUSOCK* 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
At 2.2 percent of GDP in 2006, the most recent comparable year, U.S. 
charitable giving is approximately twice as high as that of the U.K. and 
roughly fourfold that of Ireland, the next most charitable E.U. country. (At 
the individual level, France and Germany barely give at all.)2 Yet even as 
overall wealth has continued to increase in the U.S. (notably, among higher-
income households, which are disproportionately likely to make significant 
charitable donations), overall philanthropic giving has, over the past genera-
tion, remained roughly constant as a percentage of economic activity.3 
Giving has remained flat even as a variety of rationales have emerged 
for the need for more such giving: declining discretionary government 
spending because of increased fixed costs; concern, in some quarters, over 
the efficacy of publicly funded social programs; and new social needs in the 
wake of stagnant wage growth and decreased workforce participation. At 
the same time, a new generation of not-for-profits, led by young social en-
trepreneurs, is injecting both greater dynamism and stiffer competition for 
funds into the charity marketplace. 
Given such conditions, the question of whether total U.S. philanthropic 
giving remains flat, or increases, becomes increasingly pertinent. One spe-
cific, tax-advantaged vehicle for charitable giving, Donor-Advised Funds 
(DAFs, see box, page 2), shows signs—thanks to a 2006 clarification of the 
federal tax law governing them, as well as their increased marketing by ma-
jor national financial-services firms (MNFSFs)—of becoming a means 
through which net U.S. charitable giving, along with the funds supporting 
it, might significantly increase. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 The original title of this paper is “Growing Giving: American Philanthropy and the Potential 
of Donor-Advised Funds”. It has been modified for this conference. 
 * Manhattan Institute. Thanks to the Manhattan Institute’s Alex Armlovich for his research 
assistance. 
 2 Charities Aid Foundation: International Comparisons of Charitable Giving in 2006, 
https://www.cafonline.org/PDF/International%20Comparisons%20of%20Charitable%20Giving.pdf. 
 3 Statistics from Giving USA: The Annual Report on Philanthropy, 2012 Edition, 
http://philanthropy.com/article/The-Stubborn-2-Giving-Rate/139811. 
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This paper examines the potential for further growth in donor-advised 
funds: recent DAF growth (especially in funds established and marketed by 
National DAF Sponsoring Organizations, or National DAF Sponsoring Or-
ganizations, some of which are MNFSFs) could signal the start of a surge in 
the volume of total charitable giving, or merely its redirection through a 
new, more convenient vehicle (rather than, say, cumbersome individual 
check-writing). This paper concludes that, on balance, DAFs of all kinds—
particularly, though not exclusively, accounts held with National DAFs—
provide the preconditions for significant growth in overall U.S. charitable 
giving. If realized, such growth would likely be driven by: 
1. Increased giving from increased DAF participation, driven by 
MNFSFs. Since 2007, the year after federal tax law significantly clarified 
the legal status and reporting requirements of DAFs, the number of such 
individual accounts held by National DAF Sponsoring Organizations—
including MNFSFs like Fidelity Charitable, Vanguard Charitable, and 
Schwab Charitable—increased from 72,590 to 112,170, with the value of 
assets in such accounts growing from $11.11 billion to $24.82 billion.4 
Growth factors facilitated by National DAF Sponsoring Organizations in-
clude ease of donation (especially for donations of appreciated assets, such 
as equities) and control over the timing of donations. 
2. Nonredundant charitable giving. National DAF-giving likely com-
plements community foundation–based DAF-giving. DAF account holders 
in community foundations (which, prior to the growth of National DAF 
Sponsoring Organizations, had been the most important umbrella organiza-
tions for DAF accounts) typically support different charitable causes from 
those that DAF-account holders in National DAF Sponsoring Organizations 
do. 
3. Increased charitable capital. Such an increase would result from 
tax-free appreciation of DAF assets (a consequence of the fact that the full 
amount of funds deposited in DAFs are not typically distributed in the same 
year that they are donated). Such funds, when held in National DAF Spon-
soring Organizations, grow through investment in a mix of mutual funds 
chosen by their boards. Since 2009, undisbursed funds held in National 
DAF Sponsoring Organizations have appreciated by $6.56 billion.5 In con-
trast to private foundations, which must make annual grants equivalent to 5 
percent of assets, there is no legal DAF payout requirement—suggesting 
                                                                                                                           
 4 National Philanthropic Trust, “Total Value of Charitable Assets in Donor-Advised Funds by 
Charitable Sponsor Type,” 2014 DAF Report, Figure 7, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/
sponsor-type-comparison.html. 
 5 Calculations, 2009–12: cumulative contributions = $39.72 billion; cumulative grants = 
$30.22 billion; difference (contributions – grants) = $9.50 billion; change in assets = $16.06 bil-
lion; implied appreciation = +$6.56 billion. 
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that such accounts will evolve into thousands of small, individually con-
trolled charitable endowments. Typically, however, National DAF Sponsor-
ing Organizations commit to a 5 percent minimum institution-wide payout 
requirement that would eventually become binding if institution-wide assets 
fail to pay out in a timely fashion. 
Still, DAF growth is not inevitable. Changes in tax law, such as that 
proposed in the Tax Reform Act of 2014, could discourage the deposit of 
funds and assets into National DAF Sponsoring Organization-based and 
community foundation–based DAF accounts, curtailing overall U.S. chari-
table giving in the process. 
INTRODUCTION 
Private charitable giving is widely considered to be one of the distin-
guishing features of American society. The country’s $325 billion in annual 
charitable giving—by individual households, private foundations, and cor-
porations to not-for-profit organizations serving public needs—constitutes a 
significantly higher portion of the U.S. economy than in any other advanced 
economy (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Charitable Giving as Percentage of GDP, Select Countries, 
2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During 2007–13, overall DAF assets increased from $31.97 billion to 
$53.74 billion, with total charitable gifts from such accounts rising from 
$6.47 billion to $9.66 billion. Over the same period, the number of DAF 
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accounts grew from 160,941 to 217,367.6 As a consequence, charitable giv-
ing of funds disbursed from such accounts has risen disproportionately, as a 
share of total giving. 
WHAT ARE DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS? 
DAFs are individual charitable-giving accounts housed within “spon-
soring organizations”—notably, National DAF Sponsoring Organizations 
(which include MNFSFs), community foundations, and single-issue chari-
ties. DAFs allow donors to deposit cash and other assets and avail them-
selves of a federal tax deduction, for the same tax year, for the full value of 
their donation. With the exception of overhead—around 1 percent annually7 
for MNFSF-based DAFs—donations, once deposited, may be used only for 
charitable purposes. Account holders can then, at their discretion, recom-
mend grants from such funds over the remainder of their lifetimes: hence 
the name “donor-advised.” DAFs can be inherited, too. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that if DAF donations had not contin-
ued at pre–financial crisis levels in 2008, overall U.S. charitable giving 
would have declined during the height of the Great Recession. It is also 
quite plausible that if growth in DAF giving continues to increase at current 
rates—and other charitable giving from individuals, foundations, and corpo-
rations remains flat—overall U.S. charitable giving, as a percentage of the 
economy, may break through its current, roughly 2 percent of GDP, ceiling 
(Figure 2). If such a development materialized, more funds would be avail-
able to charities of all kinds, making the U.S. even more of a nation in 
which private charity forms a significant element of the social compact. 
 
Figure 2. U.S. Charitable Giving as Percentage of GDP, 1971–20128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 6 National Philanthropic Trust, 2014 DAF Report, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-
type-comparison.html. 
 7 Inclusive of administrative fees and the low- to medium-cost investment options. 
 8 Source: Giving USA, http://philanthropy.com/article/The-Stubborn-2-Giving-Rate/139811 
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I. Donor-Advised Funds: A Brief History 
DAFs are not a new phenomenon in the United States. In 1931, the 
New York Community Trust established the nation’s first DAF account 
within its tax-exempt charitable umbrella.9 The account exists to this day 
and, like other community-foundation funds that have proliferated across 
the country, provides both a legal home and advice to donors whose funds 
are housed within it. 
At present in the U.S., there are more than 750 community founda-
tions, which typically combine fund disbursements from a central pool di-
rected by staff members, with disbursements from individual DAFs (often 
directed with advice from foundation staff). The focus of such giving has 
traditionally been local and regional. In this way, community foundations 
and the DAFs they house are classified by the IRS as sponsoring organiza-
tions: tax-exempt not-for-profits that disburse financial support to other tax-
exempt not-for-profits that, in turn, provide specific types of services. 
Religiously oriented organizations—such as the Jewish Federations of 
North America (which have individual chapters analogous to community 
foundations) and various Catholic charities—have historically played im-
portant supporting-organization roles. In later years, community-foundation 
DAF accounts were augmented by nationally oriented specialty organiza-
tions. For example, Virginia-based Donors Trust provides an umbrella home 
for donors generally classified as politically conservative, who entrust their 
charitable giving to staff knowledgeable about organizations with missions 
consonant with donors’ views. The San Francisco–based Tides Foundation 
is viewed as the latter’s counterpart on the political left. 
In 2006, specific mention of DAFs, along with their codification in tax 
law, was included in the Pension Protection Act (a piece of legislation not 
generally focused on charitable giving).10 In previous years, legal uncertain-
ty had limited DAF growth; but from 2007 to 2013—the first year of high-
quality data for DAF sponsoring organizations reporting via Form 990—the 
number of DAF accounts grew by 34 percent (see Figure 3). 
  
                                                                                                                           
 9 See http://www.nycommunitytrust.org/AboutTheTrust/Overview/tabid/496/Default.aspx. 
 10 See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ280/pdf/PLAW-109publ280.pdf. 
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Figure 3. Number of DAF Accounts, 2007–1311 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before 2006, some of the largest U.S. financial-services and wealth-
management firms established separate, independent public charities to ad-
minister DAFs. Fidelity Charitable (founded by Fidelity Investments), Van-
guard Charitable (Vanguard), and Schwab Charitable (Charles Schwab), 
among others surveyed by the National Philanthropic Trust (NPT), have 
since begun marketing the idea of individual charitable accounts to the ex-
tensive customer bases at their founding companies—to considerable suc-
cess (Figure 4). The remainder of this paper largely focuses on the explo-
sive recent growth of America’s DAF industry. 
 
Figure 4. Number of Accounts by DAF Sponsoring Organization, 
2007–1312 (NPT-surveyed DAF sponsoring organizations) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Source: NPT 2014 DAF Report, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-
comparison.html 
 12 Source: NPT 2014 DAF Report, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-
comparison.html 
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II. Characteristics of Donor-Advised Funds 
Historically, DAFs have differed in notable ways from private founda-
tions, with such differences encouraging the recent surge in new DAFs. 
New DAF accounts enjoy, for instance, existing organizational infrastruc-
ture rather than being required to establish a new management structure, 
with attendant costs (as with freestanding private foundations). Private 
foundations are subject to regulations (originally enacted in 1969) requiring 
minimum annual disbursements equal to 5 percent of assets; DAFs, in con-
trast, are legal public charities and are therefore not subject to a minimum, 
nor are they subject to the 1 percent excise tax on asset appreciation that 
private foundations must pay.13 They do voluntarily implement sponsoring 
organization-wide payout minimums of 5 percent of assets, and they require 
account advisors to recommend grants at least once every several years. 
Relatively low minimum-account-opening requirements at MNFSFs 
make DAFs comparatively more attractive to smaller donors. So, too, do 
minimal administrative costs and start-up deposits. At the three largest 
MNFSFs—Fidelity Charitable, Vanguard Charitable, and Schwab Charita-
ble—minimum balances range from $5,000 to $25,000, while administra-
tive expenses (excluding investment fees) start at 0.6 percent of assets per 
year, declining as account balances grow beyond $500,000.14 Thanks to 
such advantages, small and medium donors constitute the norm (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Average Account Value by Sponsoring Organization, 2007–1315 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See http://www.nptrust.org/donor-advised-funds/daf-vs-foundation. Institutional voluntary 
payout minimums are de facto enforced by the watchful eyes of the IRS and the threat of correc-
tive legislation, should payouts falter. 
 14 See https://www.vanguardcharitable.org/individuals/fees_and_expenses. 
 15 Source: NPT 2014 DAF Report, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-comparison.
html 
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The advent of MNFSF-based DAFs makes it possible for the former to 
market the idea of charitable accounts as complements to other personal 
accounts, such as those for investment or retirement. MNFSFs enable ac-
count holders to swiftly transfer assets held in other personal accounts to 
charitable accounts held at any National DAF Sponsoring Organization. 
Fidelity, in particular, offers an appreciated securities tool to help “identify 
potential long-term appreciated securities in your Fidelity brokerage ac-
count that you might consider contributing to charity.”16 Though it can be 
used to identify appreciated assets that may easily be given to any public 
charity, the tool nonetheless provides a convenient opportunity to open a 
Fidelity Giving Account. 
Stock held in brokerage accounts can be transferred directly to DAFs 
without first being sold. The increased value of such shares—which would 
be taxed as a capital gain if the appreciation were realized as a private 
gain—is not taxed. Indeed, the value of long-term appreciated assets of all 
kinds—artwork, for instance—can be assigned to DAF accounts without 
being taxed.17 Crucially, the full appreciated value of assets can qualify for 
the charitable tax deduction from the amount of income subject to federal 
income tax (provided such a deduction does not exceed 50 percent of gross 
income). In addition, assets that an individual realizes from major liquida-
tion events (such as the sale of a privately held business) can be directly 
transferred to DAFs without facing capital-gains taxes, subject to limits on 
the amount of deductible income in a single year.18 
MNFSFs are particularly well prepared to harvest such capital gains 
for the charitable purposes of DAFs. MNFSFs have the capacity to assess 
such donations as appreciated art and rapidly credit DAFs with accurate 
values. Vanguard largely relies on a third party for working with these as-
sets; Fidelity offers significant internal expertise. Individual private chari-
ties, in contrast, may have to seek specialized legal help in the (relatively 
rare) event that they receive such gifts. Stated differently, MNFSFs have the 
capacity to facilitate charitable giving—giving that might not otherwise oc-
cur. 
Additionally, assets held in DAF accounts that have not been distribut-
ed continue to appreciate, on average, over long periods. Assets in NPT-
surveyed National DAF Sponsoring Organizations—including Vanguard, 
Fidelity, and Schwab—grew from $11.1 billion in 2006 to $24.82 billion in 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See https://www.fidelity.com/charitable-giving/overview. 
 17 See http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/giving-strategies/tax-estate-planning/donate-non-
publicly-traded-assets.shtml. 
 18 See http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/docs/Using-Private-Foundations-and-Donor-Advised-
Funds.pdf. 
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2013.19 From inception in 1991 through 2013, Fidelity Charitable’s invest-
ments alone have made an additional $2 billion available for grant-
making.20 
The advent of the DAF industry can thus be said to set the stage for the 
growth of financial assets that may be put only to charitable purposes (and 
receive an immediate, one-year tax break for that reason) but that can be 
disbursed at the recommendation of the donor or his heirs. This can be an 
attractive feature for individuals nearing retirement who may wish to avail 
themselves of DAF tax advantages—while they themselves are still subject 
to high marginal tax rates—thereby reserving funds for charitable purposes, 
to be pondered over the course of their retirement. 
Critics of DAFs, such as Professor Ray Madoff of Boston College Law 
School, worry that donations would be so slow as to deprive charitable or-
ganizations of needed funds: “I and many other critics of the laws govern-
ing the funds are concerned that donors and the people who manage their 
money have been the primary recipients of benefits from the growth of do-
nor-advised funds, while charities and the people they serve are being 
starved of resources. Donors get an immediate up-front tax benefit—money 
that drains the federal treasury of much-needed revenue for government 
services—but face no obligations to ensure that the money makes its way 
out to charities in a timely manner. Under the law, these funds can be kept 
in place in perpetuity.”21 
Madoff argues that the growth of inheritable funds with “merely” vol-
untary payout requirements risks tying up large pools of capital long after 
the deaths of the actual donors—echoing a concern historically consonant 
with the political Right over private foundations that stray from original 
“donor intent.” Such criticism is generally credited with having prompted 
the February 2014 House Ways and Means Committee proposal that would 
have required funds placed in DAF accounts to be distributed within five 
years, or be subject to a 20 percent excise tax. Section VI discusses the im-
plications of this proposal. 
III. Fee Structure 
All MNFSF-based DAF providers—Fidelity, Vanguard, and Schwab—
charge administration and investment fees. All require a minimum starting 
account balance: $5,000 (Fidelity and Schwab) and $25,000 (Van-
guard). For the average account, administrative fees for MNFSFs are ap-
                                                                                                                           
 19 See http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-comparison.html#national-charities. 
 20 See http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/about-us/history.shtml. 
 21 Ray Madoff, “5 Myths About Payout Rules,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, January 13, 2014, 
http://philanthropy.com/article/5-Myths-About-Payout-Rules-for/143919. 
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proximately 0.6 percent of assets; as balances rise, MNFSFs reduce charges 
(0.6 percent on the first $500,000; 0.4 percent on the next $500,000; and so 
on). Such fees, they assert, with some justification, are imposed to cover 
costs, not reap profits. 
Vanguard, for example, realized less than $5 million in total fees for 
Vanguard Charitable in fiscal year 2014—a trivial sum when compared with 
overall revenues for an organization managing roughly $3 trillion.22 Fideli-
ty, which offers 15 mutual funds for those with accounts in Fidelity Chari-
table, sets fees (by independent boards of those respective funds) ranging 
from 0.07 to 1.17 percent. Fidelity Charitable’s assets, meanwhile, consti-
tute less than 1 percent of Fidelity’s nearly $2 trillion in assets under man-
agement.23 
The MNFSFs note that if individual donors were to establish their own 
foundations to house, invest, and disburse funds, then expenses—and thus 
the extent of funds diverted from charitable purposes—would inevitably be 
higher. Office and staff costs might well be incurred. Asset-management 
fees would certainly be incurred, just as they are when funds are managed 
by single-issue charities, community foundations, or MNFSFs. 
Were, on the other hand, all DAFs donated immediately and entirely to 
charitable organizations, fewer administrative costs might plausibly be in-
curred. Such a scenario would also, of course, be entirely hypothetical: 
nonprofits themselves must manage the funds that they receive and pay oth-
ers to do so, after all. Indeed, nonprofits must pay processing fees when 
receiving donations via credit card–based transactions. Moreover, in many 
situations (donations, say, of appreciated assets, such as stocks, art, and an-
tiques), individual nonprofits often lack staff capacity for their conversion 
into the liquid assets required to cover expenses. In contrast, administrative 
fees at Fidelity cover the relevant legal costs of effectuating most such 
transactions.24 Other MNFSF-sponsored DAFs are similar. 
Another option for medium and large donors considering DAFs is the 
formation of a non-operating private foundation, where typical administra-
tive expenses are 6.4 percent of grants25 (versus, say, under 4.5 percent of 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-vanguard-hit-3-trillion-1412539983. 
 23 See https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/fidelity-by-numbers/corporate-statistics. 
 24 See http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/docs/Donating-Non-Publicly-Traded-Assets.pdf: 
“Fidelity Charitable does not charge a direct fee for helping its donors contribute complex assets 
(only unrelated business income tax, if applicable, actual carrying and maintenance costs, and 
certain tax preparation consultancy costs are taken from the proceeds of the sale of the contributed 
asset).” 
 25 Foundation Center, “Benchmarking Foundation Administrative Expenses: Update on How 
Operating Characteristics Affect Spending,” 2012, http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/
research/pdf/expenses2012.pdf. 
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grants for Vanguard).26 Further, it is extremely unlikely that an active port-
folio manager hired by a private foundation could match the investment 
expense ratio of even the most expensive Vanguard fund (a mere 0.17 per-
cent of assets) offered by Vanguard Charitable. Median investment expenses 
at private family foundations equal approximately 0.7 percent of assets, ac-
cording to the Foundation Center.27 In other words, Vanguard’s investment 
expenses are threefold lower than those of the median private family foun-
dation. Moreover, for small donors with $250,000 or less to give, starting a 
foundation is not an option. Even for those with $5–$10 million to give, the 
start-up costs of a private foundation can be daunting. 
It may be true that the advent of MNFSF-sponsored DAFs enables 
their parent sponsors to continue to earn the same investment fees from 
DAF donors that would have been lost, had the funds been donated to a pri-
vate family foundation or other similar recipient. But these investment fees 
are lower, and the charitable tax benefits higher, than those available from 
nonoperating private foundations. 
Ultimately, the debate over DAFs is one not about fees that may flow 
to private financial firms but about whether the U.S. wants to encourage 
growth in charitable giving as a portion of the economy. DAF account bal-
ances can be used, after all, for one thing and one thing only: charitable giv-
ing. Opposition to DAF giving is therefore not a defense of charity against 
large financial firms but simply an expression of impatience: better, the ar-
gument goes, to give smaller amounts immediately than larger amounts in 
the future. 
IV. DAF Giving Patterns 
As mentioned, debate over the merits of DAFs implicitly involves an-
swering the question of whether it is worth forgoing tax revenue to encour-
age charitable giving—even if it means allowing charitable funds to be dis-
bursed more slowly than might otherwise be the case (while gaining value 
in the interim). This is, fundamentally, a values question for the U.S. to con-
sider, rooted in one’s views on whether a larger charitable sector is desira-
ble. For those (such as this writer) who hold the view that charitable giving 
                                                                                                                           
Foundation Center calculates administrative expenses as a percentage of grants, rather than a per-
centage of assets, and does not include investment expenses in the ratio. 
 26 Estimate based on FY2014 data from Vanguard Charitable. We estimated V.C. administra-
tive expenses at 4.5 percent of FY2014 grants as the upper bound of V.C.’s expense ratio in this 
metric by assuming that all V.C. account holders’ assets were in the most expensive administrative 
cost tier. This rate applies only to an account holder’s first $500,000 in assets. 
 27 Council on Foundations, “Governance & Administrative Expenses: Key Findings,” p. 5, 
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/cof_manhighlights.pdf. 
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can support ideas and organizations for which government initiative cannot 
easily substitute, the answer is yes. 
As a practical matter, concern to date about the pace of DAF distribu-
tions—itself a reflection of the assumption that rapid distributions are posi-
tive—does not appear warranted. The MNFSFs that are surveyed by NPT 
are reporting distributions equal to, on average, 21.5 percent annually, per 
account (Figure 6), far higher than the mere 5 percent distribution of asset 
value required of private foundations. The 21.5 percent average, true, masks 
wide variation. Some MNFSF-based DAF donors make no distributions in a 
given year; others distribute their entire funds. Such differences reflect 
varying circumstances, including the death of account holders and subse-
quent family reconsideration of recipient organizations. Notably, all Nation-
al DAF Sponsoring Organizations have committed to an overall annual 
payout rate for DAF accounts, collectively, of no lower than 5 percent. 
 
Figure 6. Distributions by Percentage of Sponsoring Organizations’ 
Assets, 2007–1328 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is, however, certainly the case that all assets deposited in DAFs are 
not immediately distributed. Because they are invested with an eye toward 
increasing their value, such undistributed assets have appreciated (Figure 7) 
and will likely continue to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Source: NPT 2014 DAF Report, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-comparison.
html 
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Figure 7. Value of Undistributed Assets by Sponsoring Organization, 
2007–1329 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Still, it is virtually impossible to estimate the likely future rate of in-
crease in the value of such undistributed assets. Doing so requires a great 
many assumptions, including the extent of undistributed assets; the growth 
in individual accounts; and the rate of investment return (itself linked to 
broader assumptions about the U.S. economy and interest rates). Neverthe-
less, the potential for DAF growth is significant. 
If, for example, DAF account holdings earn 6 percent annually, if con-
tributions continue to grow at the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 
9.43 percent since 2007, and if the payout ratio holds at its average level 
since 2007 (i.e., about 22 percent of assets), then growth in appreciated as-
sets—reserved exclusively for distribution to charitable organizations—
could exceed $100 billion by 2020. 
Yet rather than view this latter figure as capital denied to charity, it can 
instead be understood as a major philanthropic capital reserve fund that can 
be deployed, say, in the event of natural disasters or public health emergen-
cies. And while the charitable affiliates of Fidelity, Vanguard, and Schwab 
do not, as a rule, provide guidance on organizations meriting support, they 
do offer useful links to those offering assistance in the aftermath of hurri-
canes and, more recently, in response to the West African Ebola virus out-
break.30 In 2011, $15.5 million in relief efforts was donated, via these links, 
in the six months following Hurricane Sandy. Likewise, $5.9 million has 
been donated, to date, to organizations seeking to control the Ebola out-
break.31 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Source: NPT 2014 DAF Report, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-comparison.
html 
 30 E-mail correspondence with Fidelity Charitable management. 
 31 Ibid. 
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In effect, growing MNFSF-based DAFs could become a major new 
source of philanthropic capital, controlled by relatively small savers but 
operating at a scale rivaling that of the largest private foundations, or even 
some government agencies (absent, of course, the central direction). Web-
sites such as Charity Navigator—which rate U.S. charities on a range of 
criteria and facilitate direct donations from DAF accounts to cooperating 
charities—could magnify this phenomenon.32 Because of their appreciated 
reserves, DAFs may respond countercyclically to economic downturns, too, 
providing a floor for overall charitable giving (Figure 8). In the wake of the 
2008 economic crisis, this was largely the case: donations from accounts at 
two of the three MNFSFs increased even as overall U.S. charitable giving 
declined, from $311 billion in 2007 to $299.61 billion in 2008.33 
 
Figure 8. DAF Distributions by Sponsoring Organization, 2007–1334 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This potential for growth clearly applies to all DAFs, not merely to 
those based in MNFSFs. Thanks to hefty donations (such as $1.5 billion in 
gifts by Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg to the Silicon Valley Community 
Foundation),35 some community foundations are also growing at a signifi-
cant pace, such that they might be considered peers of MNFSF-based 
DAFs—in terms of assets, if not number of individual account holders 
(Figure 9). 
 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Harnessing the growing popularity of DAFs to greatly simplify charitable giving, DAF 
Direct—the product of a joint initiative led by Fidelity Charitable—is the first web application 
enabling donors to initiate a grant from their DAF to a nonprofit, when on the latter’s website. 
 33 Giving USA 2011, “The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2010,” pp. 290–91. 
Figures are in 2010 dollars. 
 34 Source: NPT 2014 DAF Report, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-comparison.
html 
 35 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/10528624/Mark-Zuckerberg-donates-
1bn-to-charity.html. 
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Figure 9. Assets by Sponsoring Organization, 2007–1336 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. MNFSF-Based DAFs: Complements or Competition? 
The fact that assets and distributions from MNFSF-based DAFs have 
increased significantly, while overall U.S. charitable giving has remained 
flat, raises an important question: Are the former merely a new vehicle for 
directing charitable giving to organizations that otherwise would have re-
ceived funds? 
It is a difficult question to answer, but it is possible to assess whether, 
in specific metropolitan areas, participants in MNFSF-based DAFs are sup-
porting organizations that might not otherwise receive support. In other 
words, is the sizable marketing power of MNFSFs leading to the participa-
tion of donors who support different organizations from, say, those support-
ed by a metropolitan area’s community foundations? This paper uses data 
provided by Fidelity, Vanguard, and Schwab to compare giving patterns for 
donors in MNFSF-based DAFs with those of community foundations (in-
cluding from the latter’s general funds and DAF accounts). 
Among Metropolitan Chicago’s top 500 grant recipients by MNFSF-
based DAFs and the Chicago Community Trust (CCT) foundation, 81 recip-
ient organizations received contributions from both the former and the latter 
(Figure 10), with roughly 25 percent of grant dollars overlapping (Figure 
11). (Figure 11 also reveals that of the roughly $31 million in giving over-
lap, the majority, $20.65 million, or 16 percent of total donations, came 
from the CCT.) Stated differently, 83 percent of the top 500 organizations 
supported by MNFSF-based DAFs were not supported by CCT (and vice 
versa). As such, both types of sponsoring organizations contribute signifi-
cant diversity to charitable giving in Chicago—while indirectly supporting 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Source: NPT 2014 DAF Report, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-comparison.
html 
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the conclusion that MNFSF-based DAFs are expanding the reach of chari-
table giving nationwide. 
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In metropolitan Dallas, the author found similar results: 106 of each 
sponsoring organization type’s top 500 recipients (Figure 12) received do-
nations from MNFSFs and the Communities Foundation of Texas (CFT), 
with roughly 30 percent of total dollars overlapping (Figure 13).39 In metro-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Source: NPT 2014 DAF Report, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-comparison.
html 
 38 Source: Fidelity Charitable, Schwab Charitable, and CCT 
 39 We excluded a large one-off donation by a CFT DAF in 2013, to an organization that the 
MNFSFs had given several small overlapping donations. Had we not excluded this, the overlap 
would be 40 percent of the combined giving instead of 30 percent. Again, most of this overlapping 
donation came from the CFT side. 
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Figure 10. Donation Overlap in Metropolitan 
Chicago by MNFSFs and the CCT, 
Top 500 Recipients, FY 2013
CCT Unique
MNFSFs Unique
Overlap
$75,210,078; 
59% 
$21,137,570; 
17% 
$20,650,519; 
16%
$10,625,228; 
8% Total Overlap: $31,275,747; 
24% 
Figure 11. Donation Overlap in Metropolitan Chicago 
by MNFSFs and the CCT, 
Top 500 Recipients, FY 2013 (Dollars and Percentage)
CCT Unique
MNFSFs Unique
CCT Overlap
MNFSFs Overlap
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politan Denver, the author found a similar trend: 91 of the top 500 recipients 
(Figure 14) account for roughly 20 percent in donation overlap, by dollar 
value (Figure 15). 
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 40 Source: Fidelity Charitable, Schwab Charitable, and CFT 
 41 Source: Fidelity Charitable, Schwab Charitable, and CFT 
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Figure 12. Donation Overlap in Metropolitan 
Dallas by MNFSFs and the CFT, Top 500 
Recipients, FY 2013
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Figure 13. Donation Overlap in Metropolitan Dallas by 
MNFSFs and the CFT, Top 500 Recipients, 
FY 2013 (Dollars and Percentage)
CFT Unique
MNFSFs Unique
CFT Overlap
MNFSFs Overlap
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Figure 1442 
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VI. Implications of Proposed Regulatory Change 
Arguably the most significant potential regulatory change affecting 
donor-advised funds is the February 2014 proposal by Rep. David Camp—
which requires that funds placed in DAF accounts be distributed within five 
years, or face a 20 percent excise tax. The desire to ensure relatively rapid 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Source: Fidelity Charitable, Schwab Charitable, and DF 
 43 Source: Fidelity Charitable, Schwab Charitable, and DF 
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Figure 14. Donation Overlap in Metropolitan Denver by 
MNFSFs and the Denver Foundation, 
Top 500 Recipients, FY 2013
DF Unique
MNFSFs Unique
Overlap
$26,764,745; 
56%
$11,609,124; 
24%
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13%
$3,210,827; 
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Total Overlap: 
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Figure 15. Donation Overlap in Metropolitan Denver by 
MNFSFs and the Denver Foundation, 
Top 500 Recipients, FY 2013 (Dollars and Percentage)
DF Unique
MNFSFs Unique
DF Overlap
MNFSFs Overlap
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disbursement of such funds is understandable, especially if one assumes 
that all such funds would otherwise have been disbursed in the same tax 
year for which their charitable deduction would be realized. There are, 
however, good reasons to believe that the five-year rule would significantly 
inhibit DAF growth. 
Under the current rule, those on the cusp of retiring can avail them-
selves of a charitable tax deduction for funds set aside in a DAF and pro-
ceed to disburse such funds over the remainder of their lifetimes (almost as 
if they possessed their own family foundations but at far lower cost). This 
allows those planning retirement to reduce taxes during their earning years, 
in exchange for devoting a portion of their prospective estates to charitable 
giving. Donations made instead from retirement assets—or at a time when a 
retiree’s earned income was lower—would result in a tax deduction of less 
value, thereby diminishing the incentive to set aside funds. 
Likewise, the Camp requirement (that funds set aside be disbursed 
within five years) would diminish the capacity of DAF account holders to 
realize appreciation, which could, in turn, be devoted to favored charitable 
causes. It would also dramatically reduce account holders’ flexibility to 
change charitable-giving priorities and magnitude, perhaps based on chang-
es in family circumstances (e.g., a loved one who experiences a specific 
illness), evolving local or national needs, or the economic cycle. A rapid 
disbursement requirement would, moreover, disadvantage the many small, 
individual DAF donors over private foundations, which are only required to 
distribute 5 percent of overall assets annually. 
In addition, the Camp requirement would impose considerable admin-
istrative obligations on sponsoring organizations. Sponsoring organizations 
would be called upon to track annual contributions to ensure that charitable 
donations of equal value were made within five years—at the same time 
additional funds were (potentially) being deposited and appreciation of de-
posited assets was occurring. Onerous verification procedures to ensure 
compliance would have to be established. Ultimately, rising administrative 
costs would reduce the amount of DAF balances available for charitable 
giving. 
The time-sensitive distribution requirement embraced by Madoff and 
other DAF critics cannot obscure the fact that money that goes to donor-
advised funds has been given irrevocably to charity. Therefore, it is difficult 
to understand why distribution within an arbitrary five-year period is pref-
erable. At present, roughly 21 percent of National DAF Sponsoring Organi-
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zations are distributed annually44—a trend that, if extrapolated, means that 
virtually all DAF deposits are disbursed, voluntarily, within five years. 
CONCLUSION: CAN MNFSF-BASED DAFS BOOST OVERALL U.S. 
CHARITABLE GIVING? 
As discussed, several factors will determine whether DAF growth 
leads to overall growth in U.S. charitable giving. Bullish forecasters should 
remain cautious: to date, DAF growth has coincided with a small decline in 
overall giving as a percentage of GDP.45 The following observations never-
theless offer cause for optimism: 
• Continued growth in appreciated DAF assets will lead to a significant 
pool of capital that, because gifts to DAF accounts are irrevocable, will 
be available exclusively for charitable giving. (Such appreciation could 
be limited if a more rapid payout rule is introduced.) 
•  Administrative efficiencies enjoyed by the large tax accounting teams 
and legal compliance departments at MNFSFs facilitate the giving of 
illiquid assets, thus reducing the effective cost of giving. 
•  Continued growth in the number of DAF account holders could precip-
itate increased charitable giving. (In surveys of account holders con-
ducted by Fidelity Charitable, about two-thirds of respondents indicat-
ed that the use of a DAF account likely increases their charitable giv-
ing.)46 
•  The potential for growth in charitable accounts is significant: even 
now, only a small fraction of account holders at MNFSFs have DAF 
accounts. 
The possibility that new DAF accounts will, over time, merely substi-
tute for traditional check-writing to charities cannot be dismissed, but nu-
merous factors—from convenience to asset appreciation—suggest that 
DAFs housed in MNFSFs and major community foundations could signal a 
new era in U.S. mass philanthropy (one rivaling, say, the Community Chest 
/ United Way movement of the 1920s). The potential thus exists for a large 
group of relatively small donors to make a big positive difference in the 
magnitude of what is already the world’s largest charitable giving sector. 
                                                                                                                           
 44 NPT 2014 DAF Report, “Total Payout Rate from Donor-Advised Funds by Charitable 
Sponsor Type,” Figure 11, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-report/sponsor-type-comparison.html. 
 45 See http://philanthropy.com/article/The-Stubborn-2-Giving-Rate/139811. 
 46 See http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/docs/Giving-Report-2014.pdf. 
